Are people with autism the mindreaders here?

Hanne De Jaegher, University of Sussex. Abstract, ESPP 2006

In this paper an argument is presented that casts doubt on the proposal that a ‘mindreading’ capacity (also called a Theory of Mind or mentalising capacity) is at the basis of our social understanding. In order to do this, I draw on the characteristics of mindreading and Baron-Cohen’s recent suggestion that autism is a form of ‘extreme systemising’. I will suggest that mindreading can be conceived as a systemising capacity and therefore that people with autism would be expected to be good at it, in line with Baron-Cohen’s suggestion that people with autism are extreme systemisers. It turns out that some people with autism are indeed good at mindreading. Still, however, they lack interpersonal skills in everyday, naturally occurring social situations. This casts doubt on the idea that mindreading is the bedrock of social understanding capacities. But what does it mean more positively? Many of the recent criticisms of the ToM approach coincide with a call for a more embodied approach (see e.g. Gallagher 2001; McGeer 2001; Gallagher 2005). The argument presented here also leads to this conclusion.