Intersubjectivity and Embodiment conference, Leuven, Belgium,
15-16/09/Õ03
Hanneke De Jaegher, COGS, University of Sussex, UK
Research on
intelligence or cognition has long focused on object-cognition. The embodiment approach to
perception and cognition (Clark 1997;
O'Regan and No‘ 2001) situates itself
very much within this tradition. Recently, interest in social aspects of
intelligence and cognition, and in the influence of our being social creatures
on the nature and development of cognition, is reviving[1]. The embodiment
approach will inevitably follow this shift in emphasis in cognitive science.
The slogan Òno
cognition without a bodyÓ is by now well accepted. It seems however, that the
translation of this motto in terms of investigations of social cognition: Òno
intersubjectivity without a bodyÓ would be even more obvious, natural, or
self-evident. How can you interact with others if you do not have a body?
Moreover, how
can you interact with others if there are not two bodies?
For
intersubjectivity, you need a body, furthermore you need a body essentially in interaction.
Interaction is an excellent concept, for in a conversation (in the broadest
sense of the word) you are not only in your own action, but you are in the
action that goes on precisely between persons.
People with
autism give the impression of not being in the interaction.
Explanatory
theories of autism have proposed that it is a deficit in (or even lack of) theory
of mind
(Leslie 1987;
Baron-Cohen 1995), that
individuals with autism have weak central coherence (Frith 1989;
HappŽ 1999), or that they
have an executive dysfunction (Russell 1998).
The theory of
mind theory has been criticized for not being a genuinely developmental theory (Hendriks-Jansen
1997; Gallagher 2001; Hobson 2002) and I think
this criticism is applicable to the other two explanatory theories of autism as
well.
In order to
understand autism, a properly interactional theory is necessary. Such a theory
will be richly developmental. Theory of mind theory and others offer only
a simple sequential model. Instead we need a dynamical model of complex mutual
interanimation between mechanisms, as they change and mature (Thelen and
Smith 1994; Hendriks-Jansen 1997). Drawing upon
the work of Peter Hobson (Hobson 2002), infancy
research such as that pioneered by Trevarthen (Trevarthen
1977), studies of the mechanism
of dialogue (Jaffe and
Feldstein 1970) and work in
behavioural robotics (Di Paolo 2000;
Ikegami and Iizuka 2003), I will sketch
how such a richly developmental view will enable us to understand autism
better. I will focus on interpersonal engagement, sensory input and
integration into wholes. I will also stress the importance of rhythm as a medium for
bodily and interpersonal integration, offering this as a critical parameter for
the understanding of autism, and social interaction in general.
Baron-Cohen,
S. (1995). Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind.
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Bullowa, M., Ed. (1979). Before Speech. The Beginning of
Interpersonal Communication. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together
Again. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Condon, W. S. (1979). Neonatal entrainment and enculturation. Before
Speech. M. Bullowa. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 131-148.
Di Paolo, E. A. (2000). "Behavioural coordination, structural
congruence and entrainment in a simulation of acoustically coupled agents."
Adaptive Behaviour 8(1): 25-46.
Frith, U. (1989). Autism. Explaining the Enigma. Oxford,
Blackwell.
Gallagher, S. (2001). "The practice of mind: theory, simulation or
primary interaction?" Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(5-7): 83=108.
HappŽ, F. (1999). "Autism: cognitive style or cognitive
deficit?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3(6): 216-222.
Hendriks-Jansen, H. (1997). "The epistemology of autism: making a
case for an embodied, dynamic and historical explanation." Cybernetics
and Systems: An International Journal 28:
359-415.
Hobson, R. P. (2002). The Cradle of Thought. London, Macmillan.
Ikegami, T. and H. Iizuka (2003). Joint attention and dynamics
repertoire in coupled dynamic recognizers. AISB '03 Convention: Cognition
in Machines and Animals, Aberystwyth, Wales.
Jaffe, J. and S. Feldstein (1970). Rhythms of Dialogue. London,
Academic Press.
Leslie, A. M. (1987). "Pretense and representation: The origins of
"Theory of Mind"." Psychological Review 94(4): 412-426.
O'Regan, J. K. and A. No‘ (2001). "A sensorimotor account of vision
and visual consciousness." Behavioural and Brain Sciences 24(5): 883-917.
Russell, J., Ed. (1998). Autism as an Executive Disorder. Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
Schaffer, H. R., Ed. (1977). Studies in Mother-Infant Interaction.
London, Academic Press.
Thelen, E. and L. B. Smith (1994). A Dynamic Systems Approach to the
Development of Cognition and Action. London, Bradford.
Trevarthen, C. (1977). Descriptive analyses of infant communicative
behaviour. Studies in Mother-Infant Interaction. H. R. Schaffer. London,
Academic Press: 227-270.
[1] Some examples:
Infancy research done in the 1970Õs (Schaffer 1977; Bullowa 1979) and the study of dialogues (Jaffe and Feldstein 1970; Condon 1979) have stayed largely within psychology and
have never been thoroughly integrated into cognitive science. Research into
social cognition in the field of AI has always been in the margin (if it
existed at all), and only recently its importance has started to gain real
attention, see, among others, the work done at MIT by Cynthia Breazeal and
Brian Scassellati on Kismet and Cog
(http://www.ai.mit.edu/research/projects/projects.shtml#kismet).