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Aeronautical Networks from the Ground Up The Challenges of Complex Systems Engineering and System(s) of Systems

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## Context

- Airbus + Astrium + Cassidian + IW +
  Eurocopter +... = EADS
- Fixed and mobile networks + PMR + Cyber\*+System Integration+Defense = Cassidian
- EADS makes everything that flies and supplies all the supporting services
- Mainly professional systems but...
- Also systems that the public is a part
  of and depends on

#### Lesser Problems

- IP or not IP use the best, but it must be an International Standard
- Internet of Things, sensors, actuators, SCADA
- Solution selection, design and implementation from the top down
  - Complexity can often be managed
- Security and cyber\* issues
  - Cost, mobility, latency and heterogeneity excepted
- Hardware, software, human in the loop
- Multi/interdisciplinarity



#### Problems

- Legacy integration, stranded assets, future growth
  - Coexistence, interworking and interoperability
  - Some services do not (easily) cross internetwork boundaries
- Things do not interoperate anyway
- How to write, implement and enforce SLAs
  - QoS, grade of service, metrics & KPIs
- Privacy especially for you and me
- Information networking how do we find out what we know?
  - Existential epistemiology
  - How do we allow/stop others knowing?

## The Disaster Area of Bottom-Up Legacy Integration



#### What Could Possibly Go Wrong?



## ATN of the Future?



## ATN Stack: ATN/ISO

AOC	ATS						
Mess	aging						
TP4		IDRP				Voice	
CLNPLMEX.25AVLC (modified HDLC + X.32 XIDs)							
Air, Ground, Satellite Link							g
VDL	LDACS	WiMAX	Sate	ellite Fixe	d Ot	ther	
<b>2,3,4</b> D10 CASSIDIAN - All rights res	erved		S-N gro	lode air to und?		<b>SIDIAN</b> Pa	age





#### Of course, it can be simpler...



Dedicated circuit – no session (call set-up), internetwork routing Link layer + messaging protocol provides transport service

But no security...



#### Top Down - the UAS Enterprise



#### **Possible UAS Architecture**



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## Background: It Is All About Hazards



## **UAS** Communications





#### **Multiple Access**









#### **DLEP Associations + L2 Tunnels**





## A Certification Process for UAS

- Define the requirements on comms made by UAS functions
- Specify the initial solution, in terms of architecture, functions, and performance criteria, that will fulfil these requirements end-to-end and layer by layer
- Estimate the vulnerabilities, threats that expose them, and the level of risk that those threats turn into actual events
- Refine the initial solution, adding mitigating measures, reducing vulnerabilities, etc.
- Develop and get approval by the Regulator (EASA) of a
  - Compliance Check List
  - A collection of Certification Review Items (the differences)
  - Acceptable Means of Compliance
- AND... specific to comms; political; economic...
  - Make sure that the resources and infrastructure are available to make UAS happen

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#### What do we need?

- Formal design methods and methodologies for ontology and epistemiology
- Theory of secure trusted cooperating objects semantics, scalability, real-time, mobility and robustness, what is necessary, what is sufficient
- Information networking, not communications
- Tools for formal verification for dependability
- A sense of history it has been done before and elsewhere
- A sense of future our job is exploitation but we need visionaries and leadership



# Thank you! Questions?

