

# Cooperation in Decentralised Networks

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# Cooperation in Decentralised Networks

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- 1) **Reciprocation**
- 2) Cooperation over longer distances
- 3) Delivery receipts

# Background

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- Peer-to-peer, mobile ad hoc networks
- Infrastructure provided by users
- **Incentives** to contribute resources

# Incentives

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Three approaches:

- Micropayments
- Reputations
- Reciprocation

# Reciprocation

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- “Payment in kind” between neighbours
- Doesn't require currency
- Doesn't require system-wide identities

# Requirements for Reciprocation

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1. Authentication between neighbours
2. Expect a continuing relationship
3. Measure the benefit provided by neighbours

# Is Reciprocation Rational?

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- Will selfish nodes reciprocate?
- Need to define selfishness
- Economics: **utility-maximising behaviour**

# Definition of Expected Utility

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- Every action has a **cost** and one or more possible **outcomes**
- Every outcome has a **benefit** and a **probability**
- **Expected benefit** = mean benefit of all outcomes, weighted by probability
- **Expected utility** = expected benefit  $\div$  cost



# Definition of Selfishness

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- Given a choice of actions, a **selfish node** always chooses the action with the highest expected utility
- Maximise benefit for a given cost
- Minimise cost for a given benefit
- Costs and benefits are **subjective**

# A Selfish View of Reciprocation

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- Assume neighbours are selfish
- Measure the benefit provided by each neighbour
- Benefit is attributable to the work done for the neighbour
- Benefit per unit of work done tells us the **expected benefit** of doing more work

# Prioritising Requests

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- “A selfish node always chooses the action with the highest expected utility”
- Serve requests in decreasing order of expected utility, regardless of the order of arrival
  - Cooperative neighbours get higher priority
  - As a neighbour is served, its priority decreases

# Summary: Reciprocation

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- Cooperation between immediate neighbours
- Only requires local information
  - Decentralised
  - Scalable
- Rational for selfish nodes to reciprocate

# Cooperation in Decentralised Networks

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# Cooperation Over Longer Distances

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- Reciprocation is local (single-hop)
- What about multi-hop interactions?
  - Peer-to-peer search
  - Packet forwarding

# Cooperation Over Longer Distances

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- Break each multi-hop interaction into a series of single-hop interactions
- Each node:
  - Provides a service to its upstream neighbour
  - Requests a service from its downstream neighbour

# Proof of Work


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- Need to measure the benefit provided by the downstream neighbour
- Final node creates a **proof of work**
- Each node **verifies** the proof and forwards it upstream



# Proof of Work

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# Proof of Work

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- What is a suitable proof of work?
- Depends on the nature of the work...

# Cooperation in Decentralised Networks

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- 1) Reciprocation
- 2) Cooperation over longer distances
- 3) **Delivery receipts**

# Delivery Receipts

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- Proof of work for multi-hop packet forwarding
- Based on one-way hash functions
- Endpoints share a secret **authentication key**
- Relays don't need any keys

# Delivery Receipts: Downstream

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- Sender creates a **unique secret** for each packet
- The hash of the secret is attached to the packet
- Relays store the hash of the secret


# Delivery Receipts: Upstream

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- Recipient generates **the same secret** and sends it as a **receipt**
- Relays hash the receipt and compare it to the stored value
- The receipt is forwarded back to the sender
- Each node has proof that its downstream neighbour forwarded the packet

# Delivery Receipts Example


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# Delivery Receipts Example

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# Security Requirements

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- Relays must not be able to forge receipts
  - No two packets have the same receipt
  - Receipts don't leak information about the authentication key
  - The hash function is 2nd-preimage-resistant
- Modifying the packet invalidates the receipt

# Implementation Using MACs

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- Message authentication codes have all the required properties
- The receipt is the MAC of the packet
- The hash of the MAC is attached to the packet
- Relays don't verify the receipt *as a MAC* – they just hash it and compare it to the stored value

# Overhead of Delivery Receipts

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- Bandwidth overhead: 20 bytes/packet
- Processing overhead: one hash/packet
- Storage overhead: 20 bytes/packet  $\times$  RTT
  - OK if packets are large (file transfer)
  - May not be OK if packets are small and frequent (games/voice)

# Reliability

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- What if a node forwards a packet that is later dropped downstream?
- The node has done work but can't prove it

# Measuring Reliability

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- Measure the reliability of the downstream path
- Estimate the probability of getting a receipt
- “Expected benefit = mean benefit of all outcomes, weighted by probability”
- Forwarding on unreliable paths has lower expected utility

# Summary

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- Decentralised networks need **incentives**
- **Reciprocation** can support multi-hop interactions
  - With a suitable **proof of work**
- **Delivery receipts** provide proof of work for packet forwarding

# Questions?

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