archives

Archives of the E-Intentionality mailing list are available (for members only). To subscribe to the mailing list, please visit the mailing list home page or contact the seminar organiser.

2007 SCHEDULE

2006 SCHEDULE

2005 SCHEDULE

  • 05 May: Paul Loader: Other Minds, Mirror Neurons and a Criterion for 'The Same'
  • 28 Apr: Tony Morse: Thinking Machines: The Theory Behind EDA
  • 17 Mar: Chris Davia: The Candle and the Flame
  • 03 Mar: Duncan Kuhns: The Organism in Time
  • 24 Feb: Mike Beaton: A Hierarchical Processing Account of Conscious Experience
  • 17 Feb: Hanne De Jaegher: Timely Interaction: Interactional Timing is a Key Aspect of Social Understanding
  • 10 Feb: Marzieh Asgari-Targhi: What's the Monty Hall Dilemma Got to Do with Causality?
  • 03 Feb: Marek McGann: Following Goals to the Enactive Perspective
  • 20 Jan: Tony Morse: Non-Representation, Not the Frame Problem
  • 13 Jan: Ron Chrisley: Next Generation approaches to Machine Consciousness

2004 SCHEDULE

  • 09 Dec: Paul Loader: Are Dreams Experiences?
  • 02 Dec: Jessica Hall: Sex Differences in Empathy
  • 25 Nov: Mike Beaton: Are There Subjective Facts?
  • 18 Nov: Steve Torrence: A Normative Cognitive Science?
  • 11 Nov: Marek McGann: In a World of Our Own
  • 28 Oct: Duncan Khuns: Evaluating Autopoiesis
  • 21 Oct: Anthony Morse: Why Do We Have an Internal World?
  • 14 Oct: Simon McGregor: Emergent Intelligence
  • 24 Jun: MA Students: Thesis Talks
  • 10 Jun: Steve Torrence and Mike Beaton: Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?
  • 3 Jun: Rob Clowes: Building Vehicles for Thinking
  • 27 May: Marek McGann: Autopoiesis vs. Aptopoiesish: Perspectives and Boundaries in the Evolution of Mind
  • 20 May: Ron Chrisley: Rejecting Bivalence
  • 13 May: Hanne De Jaegher: The Rhythm of Social Interaction
  • 06 May: Tony Morse: Enactive Distributed Associationism: Psychological ALife
  • 22 Apr: Marzieh Asgari-Targhi: Does Direction of Time Tell Us Anything About the Difference Between Correlation and Causation?
  • 04 Mar: Paul Loader: The Argument from Illusion and The Grand Illusion: Comparing Austin and Noë
  • 26 Feb: Ron Chrisley: A Problem for Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness
  • 19 Feb: Marek McGann: Information, Cognition, and the Fridge-Light Fallacy (Or: Cognitive Psychology is All in Your Head)
  • 12 Feb: Hanne De Jaegher: Analogies and Differences Between Perceiving that Something is Red and Perceiving that Something is a Social Agent
  • 05 Feb: Tony Morse: Solving Unknown Problems: The Limits of Learning
  • 29 Jan: Mike Beaton: Part II: Towards a New 'Theory Theory Theory'
  • 22 Jan: Mike Beaton: Part I: The Self as Thinly Veiled Confabulation
  • 15 Jan: Marzieh Asgari-Targhi: Why Do We Reply with "Because" When We Are Asked Why-Type Questions?: An Inquiry Concerning Analysis of Causal Reasoning

2003 SCHEDULE

  • 04 Dec: Rob Clowes: The Social Construction of Folk Psychology: Propositional Attitudes as Cognitive Technology (Or: Why Fodor Should Learn Not to Disrespect His Aunty)
  • 27 Nov: Steve Torrence: Ethicalized Naturalism Part II: Spinoza and the Relation Between Consciousness and Value
  • 20 Nov: Steve Torrence: Ethicalized Naturalism Part I: Spinoza and the Relation Between Consciousness and Value
  • 13 Nov: Paul Lai: The Homeostatic Means: Philosophical Naturalization of Intentionality Based on the Notion of Homeostatic Maintenance
  • 06 Nov: Marek McGann: Truth or Friction: Me and My (Rather Personal) Relationship with the World
  • 30 Oct: Hanne De Jaegher: Emergent Interpersonal Intentionality: How, When Our Bodies Meet, Our Minds Meet. Unpacking the Mechanism of Inter-subjectivity Further
  • 23 Oct: Ron Chrisley: Artificial Creativity
  • 16 Oct: Anthony Morse: The AutoIAC and Issues in Cognitive Modelling
  • 27 Jun: Short Presentations: Duncan Kuhns and Shane Lindsay
  • 20 Jun: Rob Clowes: What Vygotsky Might Say to Glenberg About Higher Cognitive Functions: Investigations Into the Embodiment of Language
  • 13 Jun: David Rosenthal: Consciousness, Qualities, and Higher-Order Thoughts
  • 06 Jun: Mike Beaton: What RoboDennett Still Doesn't Know
  • 30 May 2003: Steve Torrance: Poincare's Principle and Evaluative Cognitive Science
  • 23 May: Short Presentations: Duncan Kuhns, Paul Loader, and Rowan Lovett

2002 SCHEDULE

  • 13 Dec: Marek McGann: All Kinds of 'E'
  • 06 Dec: Tony Morse: Neural Modelling and Cognition: Associative Minds?
  • 29 Nov: Mike Beaton: The Outline for a Plausible Architecture for Abstract Thought
  • 22 Nov: David Levens: Tactical Communication by Chimpanzees?
  • 08 Nov: Hanne De Jaegher: Some Thinking on Autism and Theory-of-Mind, and Some Beyond
  • 01 Nov: Marzieh Asgari-Targhi: Causal Reasoning in AI
  • 25 Oct: Rob Charleston: Why Be a Philosopher of Cognitive Science?
  • 28 Jun: Rob Clowes: Deacon's Symbols
  • 21 Jun: Robert Charleston: Information and the Concept of Coding
  • 14 Jun: Steve Torrance: Ned Block's Even Harder Problem: How Can We Know if Commander Data Has Phenomenality as well as Functionality?
  • 07 Jun: Andy Clark: What Are We Like?
  • 31 May: Marcello Ghin: How We Know Each Other
  • 24 May: Marzieh Asgari-Targhi: Causation? A Pragmatic Solution to the Problem
  • 17 May: Katherine Power: Extended Mind Theory
  • 10 May: Cornelius Jakhelln: Why Will is Neither Self Nor Free: Will, Self and Freedom
  • 03 May: Giovanna Colombetti: Emotion Words and Emotions
  • 26 Apr: Anthony Morse: Can Psychotherapy Inform Cognitive Modelling?
  • 15 Mar: Tony Morse: Some Consequences of Strong Determinism
  • 08 Mar: Steve Torrance: Me and My Twins
  • 01 Mar: Carlos Gershenen: Contextuality: A Philosophical Paradigm
  • 22 Feb: Paul Lai: The Robustness of the Meaning Argument
  • 15 Feb: George Shipp: 3-E Intentionality: Relocating Mental States
  • 08 Feb: Rob Clowes: What We Can Learn From Adaptive Language Games
  • 01 Feb: Marcello Ghin: The Extended Mind: What Happens if the Mind Gets Overstretched?
  • 25 Jan: Discussion on Consciousness
  • 18 Jan: Anthony Morse: The Fundamental Frame Problem and Intuitions for Overcoming It
  • 11 Jan: Hanneke De-Jaegher: Robots And Herrings

2001 SCHEDULE

  • 07 Dec: George Shipp: Cognition: Distributed, Dynamical, Embedded and Embodied
  • 30 Nov: Blay Whitby: AI without Emotion
  • 23 Nov: Giovanna Colombetti: Cognitive Theories of Emotions and the Concept of Appraisal: A Dynamical Revision
  • 16 Nov: Nadja Rosental: Definite Descriptions and Endophora
  • 09 Nov: Paul Lai: Concept Acquisition and The Bodily Deficiencies
  • 02 Nov: Argi Arfani: Meaningful vs. Non-meaningful systems: Where Do We Draw the Line?
  • 26 Oct: Anthony Morse: New Associative Representations: What's Wrong With Hebb?
  • 19 Oct: Robert Charleston: On Ethics of Sentient Technologies
  • 15 Jun: Anthony Morse: On Representations
  • 08 Jun: MA Student Presentations
  • 18 May: Paul Lai: The Bodily Representations And Their Role In Information Semantics
  • 11 May: Ron Chrisley: The Person Halting Problem
  • 27 Apr: Josefa Toribio: Perceptual Experience and its Contents
  • 16 Mar: Giovanna Colombetti: Cognition, Emotion, and Affective Computing
  • 09 Mar: Tudor Jenkins: A Noisy Way to Evolve Signaling Behavior
  • 02 Mar: Andy Clark: Access and Qualia
  • 23 Feb: Paul Lai: Why There are Representational Bodily States
  • 09 Feb: Anthony Morse: From Association to Cognition
  • 02 Feb: Argi Arfani: More on Naturalism and Genuine Error
  • 26 Jan: Kane Oliver: Should Robots Rule?
  • 19 Jan: Phil Jones: Re-identification and the Emergence of Reciprocal Altruism
  • 12 Jan: Ron Chrisley: AI and God

2000 SCHEDULE

  • 15 Dec: Patrick Anselme: The Frame Problem
  • 01 Dec: Giovanna Colombetti: Analysis of Emotions
  • 24 Nov: Ron Chrisley and Anthony Morse: Systematicity in Visual Object Representation
  • 17 Nov: Paul Lai: The Criteria of Selecting Information from Perceptual Experience


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