ÿþ <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> <html> <head> <title>Igor Aleksander and Helen Morton - Machine Consciousness Symposium Speaker</title> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://www.aisb.org.uk/convention/aisb06/styles/default.css" type="text/css"> </head> <body> <center> <h1> On Architectures for Synthetic Phenomenology </h1> <h2>Igor Aleksander </h2> <h3> Dept. Of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, <br> Imperial College<br> i.aleksander@imperial.ac.uk <br><br> <h2> Helen Morton </h2> <h3>School of Social Sciences and Law <br> Brunel University,<br> Also, Imperial College<br> helen.morton@brunel.ac.uk </h3> </center> <h3>Abstract</h3> <p> Is synthetic phenomenology a valid concept? In approaching consciousness from a computational point of view, the question of phenomenology is not often explicitly addressed. In this paper we re- view the use of phenomenology as a philosophical and a cognitive construct in order to have a meaningful transfer of the concept into the computational domain. Two architectures are discussed with respect to these definitions: our  kernel, axiomatic structure and the widely quoted  Global Workspace scheme. The conclusion suggests that architectures with phenomenal properties genu- inely address the issue of modelling consciousness and indicate and the way that a machine with synthetic phenomenology may benefit from the property. <br> </p><br> </div> <div class="footer"> <p>Page maintained by: <a href="mailto:m.l.stapleton@sussex.ac.uk">Mog Stapleton</a>.<br> The contents of this site are Copyright &copy; 2006 by their respective authors.<br> They are not for citation or quotation without the express permission of the authors.</p> </div> </body> </html>